170 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK some of the statements in the report had political implications. [64] One of the proposals of the Singapore conference, however, was subsequently incorporated *as a recommendation* in the joint memoranda of November 5 and 27 which the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations submitted to the President; i. e., that military counteraction should be undertaken in the event Japan attacked or directly. threatened the territory or mandated territory of the United States, the British Commonwealth, or the Netherlands East Indies, or if the Japanese moved forces into Thailand west of 100 east or south of 10 north, Portuguese Timor, New Caledonia, or the Loyalty Islands. [65] As elsewhere pointed out, it was mutually understood at the Atlantic Conference in August of 1941 by President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill that the Governments of both the United States and Great Britain needed more time to prepare for resistance against possible Japanese attack in the Far East. [66] It was agreed, however, that steps should be taken to make clear to Japan that further aggressive action by her against neighboring countries would result in each country being compelled to take all necessary measures to safeguard the legitimate rights of its country and nationals and to insure its country's safety and security. [67] Accordingly, upon returning to Washington the President on August 17, 1941 informed the Japanese Ambassador that if the Japanese Government took any further steps in line with a program of military domination by force or threat of force of neighboring countries, the Government of the United States would be compelled to take any and all steps necessary toward safeguarding its legitimate rights and interests and toward insuring the security of the United States. [68] During the latter half of 1941 negotiations to meet the American objections to the "ADB" report proceeded slowly until discussions were opened in the Far East in November between Admiral Hart, commander in chief of our Asiatic Fleet, and Admiral Phillips, the British Far Eastern naval commander. Soon after the out-break of war, the two commanders completed arrangements for initial American and British naval dispositions to meet probable Japanese action in the Far East. Admiral Hart's report of his conversations with Admiral Phillips was received in the Navy Department about 11 p. m., December 6, 1941, and was approved in a dispatch sent out by the Chief of Naval Operations on December 7 after the attack on Pearl Harbor. [69] On December 6, 1941, Admiral Hart cabled the Chief of Naval Operations concerning a report received from Singapore that the United States had "assured British armed support under three or four eventualities". [70] None of the witnesses who were questioned on this [64] See committee exhibit No. 65. Also testimony Of Admiral Turner, committee record, pp. 5118, 6119. [65] See section, infra, Avoidance of War. [66] See Part I, this report. [67] Id. [68] Id. [69] See testimony of Admiral Stark before the joint committee. [70] Admiral Hart's dispatch was based on a communication which he had received on December 6, l941, from Capt. John M, Creighton, who was a naval attache in Singapore, as follows: "Brooke Popham received Saturday from War Department London Quote We have now received assurance of American armed support in cases as follows: Affirm we are obliged execute our plans to forestall Japs landing Isthmus of Kra or take action in reply to Nips invasion any other part of Siam; Baker if Dutch Indies are attacked and we go to their defense; Cast if Japs attack us the British. Therefore without reference to London put plan in action if first you have good info Jap expedition advancing with the apparent intention of landing in Kra, second if the Nips violate any part of Thailand Para if NEI are attacked put into operation plans agreed upon between British and Dutch. Unquote." Committee record, pp. 13520,13521. In the course of his testimony before the committee Captain Creighton stated he had no knowledge of an agreement between the United States and Great Britain or the Dutch and that the report transmitted to Admiral Hart must have come to him second-hand. Committee record, pp. 13516- 13637. PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 171 point, including Admiral Hart, [71] was aware of any evidence to substantiate the report. In his testimony, the Chief of Naval Operations suggested that the report may have been based on a misconception as to the state of negotiations following the Singapore conference. [72] There is no evidence to indicate that Japanese knowledge of the "ABC" and "ADB" conversations was an inducing factor to Japan's decision to attack the United States coincident with her thrust to the south. Indeed, the idea of attacking us at Pearl Harbor was conceived before these conversations were initiated. [73] Manifestly any estimate which the Japanese made of American probable action was based on this country's long-standing Far Eastern policy and the course of diplomatic negotiations, and not on nonpolitical, technical discussions on a staff level. [74] It should be noted that on November 7 the President took an informal vote of his Cabinet as to whether it was thought the American people would support a strike against Japan in the event she should attack England in Malaya or the Dutch in the East Indies. The cabinet was unanimous in the feeling that the country would support such a move. The following significant statement appears in the diary of Secretary Stimson for December 2: "The President is still deliberating the possibility of a message to the Emperor although all the rest of us are rather against it, but in addition to that he is quite settled, I think, that he will make a Message to the Congress and will perhaps back that up with a speech to the country. [75]" From all of the evidence, as earlier indicated, there is no basis for the conclusion that an agreement had been effected committing he United States to war against Japan in the event of an attack by her upon the British or the Dutch. It is indisputable that the President and his Cabinet contemplated presenting the problem to the Congress should our position in the Far East become intolerable. [76] Further, the reports of the 1941 staff conversations contain clear disclaimers of any political commitments and the voluminous records relating to these conversations will be searched in vain for any suggestion that an agreement binding the United States to go to war was made. Additionally, all the witnesses who were questioned on the point [77] including the ranking military and naval leaders of he country at the time testified that *in these meetings the constitutional prerogative of the Congress to declare war was scrupulously re- [71] Committee record, pp. 12785-12875. [72] Id., at p. 6317. [73] See Part II, this report re Japanese plans for the attack. [74] Before the committee, General Marshall was asked: "Let us assume first that they (the Japanese) knew that we were going to go to war if they attacked Malaya or any portion of that land there. Let us assume on the other hand that they knew we were not going to participate unless we were directly attacked ourselves. To what extent would their decisions as to action be affected by that knowledge?" He replied: "Japanese Psychology being what it is and the Japanese Army domination being what it was their general scheme for the assumption of power throughout the Far East, particularly the Southwest Pacific being known now, I don't think that would have had any particular effect one way or the other." Committee record, p. 13786. [75] See statement of Mr. Stimson. Committee record, p. 14427. [76] Admiral Stark said: "Under our Constitution the Congress had to declare war, and we could not take any independent action, so far as hostilities were concerned." Committee record, p. 13875. Again, " * * * as to our striking after declaration of war on our part, if the situation became intolerable us, and our national safety, if the Japs had not struck and we thought then that our safety was imperiled we did not fight, I think it would have been done in a constitutional manner." Committee record, pp. 13892-12893. Further, " * * * I do again make the statement, and I want it clear on the record, so far as my thoughts were concerned, that if Japan had not attacked and if conditions had become intolerable to our national safety because of what she was doing, and that would have been through the Congress." Committee record, p. 13895. [77] See testimony of Secretary Hull, Sumner Welles, General Marshall, Admiral Stark, Admiral Turner, Admiral Ingersoll, General Gerow before the committee. 172 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK spected. [78] The preliminary planning done at these conferences manifested commendable foresight and indeed our military leaders would have been inexcusably negligent had they not participated in these conversations in the face of the clear pattern of conquest mapped out by the Axis. [79] This planning saved precious time and lives once Japan struck. While no binding agreement existed, it would appear from the record that the Japanese were inclined to the belief that the United States Britain and the Netherlands would act in concert. An intercepted November 30 dispatch from Tokyo to Berlin stated in pertinent part: [80] "* * * it is clear that the United States is now in collusion with those nations (England, Australia, the Netherlands, and China) and has decided to regard Japan, along with Germany and Italy, as an enemy." A message of December 3 which was intercepted from the Washington Embassy to Tokyo related: [81] "Judging from all indications, we feel that some joint military action between Great Britain and the United States, with or without a declaration of war is a definite certainty, in the event of an occupation of Thailand." There is nothing, however, in the foregoing intelligence having any relationship to the Hawaiian situation; to have advised the commanders there that the Japanese regarded an attack upon the British or Dutch as tantamount to an attack upon the United States would have added nothing they had already been categorically warned that hostile action by Japan against the United States itself was possible at any moment. AVOIDANCE OF WAR As has been seen in considering the diplomatic background of the Pearl Harbor attack, every effort was made compatible with national honor to forestall the inevitable conflict with Japan. The policy of the United States *condemned aggression*; the policy of Japan was *predicated on aggression*. It was only a question of time, therefore, before these two irreconcilable principles would engender war. [82] Officials of our Government were faced with the problem of effecting a delicate balance between gaining time to improve our military preparedness on the one hand and not forsaking our principles, national honor, and Allies on the other. [78] That the certain prerogative of the Congress to declare war was recognized in discussions with other governments is revealed by the following dispatch from Ambassador Winant to the State Department dated November 30, 1941, transmitting a message from Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt: "It seems to me that one important method remains unused in averting war between Japan and our two countries, namely a plain declaration, secret or public as may be thought best, that any further act of aggression by Japan will lead immediately to the gravest consequences. *I realize your constitutional difficulties* but it would be tragic if Japan drifted into war by encroachment without having before her fairly and squarely the dire character of a further aggressive step. I beg you to consider whether, at the moment which you judge right which may be very near you should not *say that 'any further Japanese aggression would compel you to place the gravest issues before Congress*' or words to that effect. We would, of course, make a similar declaration or share in a joint declaration, and in any case arrangements are being made to synchronize our action with yours. Forgive me, my dear friend, for presuming to press such a course upon you, but I am convinced that it might make all the difference and prevent a melancholy extension of the war." Committee exhibit No. 24. See also testimony of General Marshall, committee record, pp. 2785 2786. [79] In the course of counsel's examination, General Gerow was asked: "* * * has it been the practice of the War Plans Division from time immemorial to make all sorts of plans about war operations on the contingency that some day or other we might be involved in hostilities with other nations?" He replied: "Oh, yes, sir. We had at all times kept current plans for operations against any major power or combination of major powers, sir * * * at one time I think we had plans against almost everybody sir, and I think that is the practice of every general staff of every nation." Committee record pp. 2673, 2674. As stated by Admiral Stark, "It is our business to draw up plans for any contingency." Committee record, p, 13977. [80] Committee exhibit No. 1 p. 205. [81] Id., at p. 227. For a full treatment of the matter, however, indicating that no agreement whatsoever existed for military action on our part in the event of a Japanese invasion of Thailand, see committee exhibit No. 169. [82] See Part I, supra, this report. PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 173 In summing up the salient features of the situation as they appeared o him in November of 1941, Mr. Stimson said: [83] "1. War with Germany and Japan would ultimately be inevitable. "2. It was vitally important that none of the nations who were then desperately fighting Germany England, Russia, or China should be knocked out of the war before the time came when we would be required to go in. "3. While we very much wanted more time in which to prepare, nevertheless we felt we had a fair chance to make an effective fight against Japan for the Philippines even if we had to enter the war at that time, in view of the air power that we were building up in the Philippines. "4. If war did come, it was important, both from the point of view of unified support of our own people as well as for the record of history, that we should not be placed in the position of firing the first shot, if this could be done without sacrificing our safety, but Japan should appear in her true role as the real aggressor." It should be noted that in October of 1940 the President advised Admiral Richardson that if the Japanese attacked Thailand, or the Kra Peninsula, or the Dutch East Indies the United States would not enter the war "that if they even attacked the Philippines he doubted whether we would enter the war, but that they (the Japanese) could not always avoid making mistakes and that as the war continued and the area of operations expanded sooner or later they would make a mistake and we would enter the war. [84]" On October 30, 1941, a message was received from Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek indicating his belief that a Japanese attack on Kunming (Yunnan), located on the Burma Road, was imminent, and that military support from outside sources, particularly by the use of United States and British air units, was the sole hope for defeat of this threat. [85] The Secretary of State requested the advice of the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations as to the attitude which this Government should assume toward a Japanese offensive against Kunming and the Burma Road. In a joint memorandum for the President dated November 5 they set forth the following conclusions and recommendations, after reviewing the situation in China: [86] "The Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff are in accord in the following conclusions: "(a) The basic military policies and strategy agreed to in the United States-British Staff conversations remain sound. The primary objective of the two nations is the defeat of Germany. If Japan be defeated and Germany remain undefeated, decision will still have not been reached. In any ease, an unlimited offensive war should not be undertaken against Japan, since such a war would greatly weaken the combined effort in the Atlantic against Germany, the most dangerous enemy. "(b) War between the United States and Japan should be avoided while building up defensive forces in the Far East, until such time as Japan attacks or directly threatens territories whose security to the United States is of very great importance. Military action against Japan should be undertaken only in one or more of the following contingencies: "(1) *A direct act of war by Japanese armed forces against the territory or mandated territory of the United States, the British Commonwealth, or the Netherlands East Indies*; "(2) *The movement of Japanese forces into Thailand to the west of 100 degrees East or south of 10 degrees North; or into Portuguese Timor, New Caledonia, or the loyalty Islands*. "(c) If war with Japan cannot be avoided, it should follow the strategic lines of existing war plans; i. e., military operations should be primarily defensive, with the object of holding territory, and weakening Japan's economic position. [83] See statement of Mr. Stimson, committee record, p. 14385. [84] Testimony of Admiral Richardson, committee record, pp. 683, 684. [85] See committee exhibit No. 16A. Similar messages were received through the American ambassador in Chungking, the Magruder Mission and the United States naval attache. Exhibits Nos. 16, 16A. [86] Committee exhibit No. 16. 174 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK "(d) Considering world strategy, a Japanese advance against Kunming, into Thailand except as previously indicated, or an attack on Russia, would not justify intervention by the United States against Japan. "(e) All possible aid short of actual war against Japan should be extended to the Chinese Central Government. "(f) In case it is decided to undertake war against Japan, complete coordinated action in the diplomatic, economic, and military fields, should be undertaken in common by the United States, the British Commonwealth, and the Netherlands East Indies. "The Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff recommend that the United States policy in the Far East be based on the above conclusions. "Specifically, they recommend: "That the dispatch of United States armed forces for intervention against Japan in China be disapproved. "That material aid to China be accelerated consonant with the needs of Russia, Great Britain, and our own forces. "That aid to the American Volunteer Group be continued and accelerated to the maximum practicable extent. "That no ultimatum be delivered to Japan." The reply of the President to Chiang Kai-shek's message was handed to the Chinese Ambassador on November 14 and followed the recommendations of General Marshall and Admiral Stark. It pointed out that it did not appear preparations by Japan for a land campaign against Kunming had advanced to a point which would indicate probable immediate imminence of an attack and observed, among other things: [87] " * * * Under existing circumstances, taking into consideration the world situation in its political, military, and economic aspects, we feel that the most effective contribution which we can make at this moment is along the line of speeding up the flow to China of our lend- lease materials and facilitating the building up of the American volunteer air force, both in personnel and in equipment. We are subjected at present, as you know, to demands from many quarters and in many connections. We are sending materials not only to China and Great Britain, but to the Dutch, the Soviet Union, and some twenty other countries that are calling urgently for equipment for self-defense. In addition. Our program for our own defense, especially the needs of our rapidly expanding Navy and Army, calls for equipment in large amount and with great promptness. Nevertheless, I shall do my utmost toward achieving expedition of increasing amounts of material for your use. Meanwhile we are exchanging views with the British Government in regard to the entire situation and the tremendous problems which are presented, with a view to effective coordinating of efforts in the most practicable ways possible." In a joint memorandum for the President, prepared under date of November 27, 1941, General Marshall and Admiral Stark pointed out that "if the current negotiations end without agreement, Japan may attack: the Burma Road; Thailand; Malaya; the Netherlands East Indies; the Philippines; the Russian Maritime Provinces." [88] They observed that: "*The most essential thing now, from the United States viewpoint, is to gain time*. Considerable Navy and Army reinforcements have been rushed to the Philippines but the desirable strength has not yet been reached. The process of reinforcement is being continued. Of great and immediate concern is the safety of the Army convoy now near Guam, and the Marine Corps' convoy just leaving Shanghai. Ground forces to a total of 21,000 are due to sail from the United States by December 8, 1941, and it is important that this troop reinforcement reach the Philippines before hostilities commence. *Precipitance of military action on our part should be avoided so long as consistent with national policy*. The longer the delay, the more positive becomes the assurance of retention of these islands as a naval and air base. [87] Id. [88] Committee exhibit No. 17. PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 175 Japanese action to the south of Formosa will be hindered and perhaps seriously blocked as long as we hold the Philippine Islands. War with Japan certainly will interrupt our transport of supplies to Siberia, and probably will interrupt the process of aiding China. "After consultation with each other, United States, British, and Dutch military authorities in the Far East agreed that joint military counteraction against Japan should be undertaken *only in case Japan attacks or directly threatens the territory mandated territory of the United States, the British Commonwealth, or the Netherlands East Indies, or should the Japanese move forces into Thailand west of 100 degrees East or south of 10 degrees North, Portuguese Timor, Nets Caledonia, or the Loyalty Islands* [89] "Japanese involvement in Yunnan or Thailand up to a certain extent is advantageous, since it leads to further dispersion, longer lines of communication, and an additional burden on communications. However, a Japanese advance to the west of 100 degrees East or south of 10 degrees North, immediately becomes a threat to Burma and Singapore. Until it is patent that Japan intends to advance beyond these lines, no action which might lead to immediate hostilities should be taken. "It is recommended that: "Prior to the completion of the Philippine reinforcement, military counteraction be considered only if Japan attacks or directly threatens United States, British, or Dutch territory, as above outlined; "In case of a Japanese advance into Thailand, Japan be warned by the United States, the British, and the Dutch Governments that advance beyond the lines indicated may lead to war, prior to such warning no joint military opposition be undertaken; "Steps be taken at once to consummate agreements with the British and Dutch for the issuance of such warning. [90]" It is to be noted that the foregoing memorandum was dated November 27, 1941, the day after the Secretary of State had delivered our Government's reply to the Japanese ultimatum of November 20. The evidence shows, however, that the memorandum was considered at an Army- Navy Joint Board meeting on the morning of November 26, following the meeting of the War Council on the preceding day at which Secretary Hull had stated that there was practically no possibility of an agreement being achieved with Japan. [91] The memorandum of the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations conveys two cardinal thoughts governing the approach of the military to the negotiations; i. e., *the most essential thing was to gain time, and the precipitance of military action should be avoided so long as consistent with national policy*. In this connection General Marshall referred to the reaction of the Army and Navy to the dropping of the thought of a modus vivendi in the following terms: [92] "My recollection is, and I have a fairly clear recollection of our disappointment that from the military point of view, meaning Army and Navy, that we would not gain any more time; our relationship to these discussions was on the one side the desire to gain as much time as we possibly could and on the other to see that commitments were not made that endangered us from a military point of view." [89] General Marshall testified that this paragraph referred to the conference of military leaders held in Singapore in April of 1941. He was asked: "When you say that the Dutch, British, and the United States military authorities had *agreed* to that action did you mean that they had made an agreement on behalf of the United States, or agreed to recommend it to their governments?" General Marshall replied: "*Agreed to recommend it*. They had no power whatever to agree for our government and it was so stipulated * * *." Committee record, pp. 2784, 2785. [90] See note 78, supra, and note 111, infra. [91] With reference to the Marshall-Stark memorandum for the President dated November 27, 1941 (exhibit No. 17), Admiral Ingersoll recalled that he "* * * presented at a Joint Board Meeting on apparently the day before this memorandum was sent, I presented at that meeting the arguments why we should not precipitate a war, and when I came back here to Washington 4 years later, I had forgotten completely that I had ever presented such a memorandum at the Joint Board Meeting. The only satisfaction I had was that it didn't sound silly after 4 years. And this was based on that." Committee record, p. 11366. [92] Committee record, p. 13775. 176 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK In pointing out the distinction between his approach and that of Secretary Stimson, [93] General Marshall said: [94] "He [Secretary Stimson] was very much afraid he feared that we would find ourselves involved in the developing situation where our disadvantages would be so great that it would be quite fatal to us when the Japanese actually broke peace. "He also felt very keenly that, and thought about this part a great deal more than I did, because it was his particular phase of the matter, that we must not go so far in delaying actions of a diplomatic nature as to sacrifice the honor of the country. He was deeply concerned about that. "My approach to the matter, of course, was much more materialistic. I was hunting for time. Hunting for time, so that whatever did happen we would be better prepared than we were at that time, that particular time. "So it was a question of resolving his views as to the honor, we will say, of the United States, and his views of a diplomatic procedure which allowed the Japanese to continue movements until we would be in a hopeless situation before the peace was broken, and mine, which as I say, were much more materialistic, as I think they should have been, that we should get as much time as we could in order to make good the terrible deficiencies in our defensive arrangements." It is apparent from the memorandum of November 27 that the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations desired more time insofar as consistent with national policy and not at the expense of forsaking the honor of the Nation. As General Marshall testified: [95] "Mine was, in a sense, a technical job. I was struggling with the means to fight. * * * *I wanted time, and the question was how much time could be given to us and still maintain the honor of the United States and not get ourselves in a hopeless position.*" Further, the memorandum relates to the matter of precipitance of war by the United States; that is, no affirmative steps should be taken by the United States to bring about war with Japan "precipitance of military action on our part should be avoided so long as consistent with national policy." As observed in reviewing the diplomatic background of the Pearl Harbor attack, the November 26 note of our Government to Japan was not a precipitant of war it was merely a laudable restatement of the principles for which we had stood for many years in the Orient. There can, therefore, be no question that the delivery to Japan of the American note of November 26 was not in any way in contravention of the expressed position of our own military. Furthermore, Tokyo advised her emissaries in Washington on November 20 that a modus vivendi would not be acceptable to Japan, [96] and in consequence had our Government submitted a modus vivendi to the Japanese, no more time would have been afforded the Army and Navy. General Marshall and Admiral Stark had themselves recommended that we take military counter-action should Japan attack the very territory which she was already poised to attack in the event she failed to secure the demands contained in the Japanese ultimatum of November 20*. [97] Indeed, at the very time Japan's ambassadors were discussing a temporary truce, her military was continuing its move to the South. Secretary Stimson's diary for November 26, 1941, reflects the following comments, among others: [98] [93] In this diary for November 27, Mr. Stimson commented: "Knox and Admiral Stark came over and conferred with me and General Gerow. Marshall is down at the maneuvers today and I feel his absence very much. There was a tendency, not unnatural, on the part of Stark and Gerow to seek for more time. I said that I was glad to have time but I didn't want it at any cost of humility on the part of the United States or of reopening the thing which would show a weakness on our part." Committee record p. 14422. [94] Committee record, p. 13821. [95] Id., at p. 13822. [96] Committee exhibit No. 1, p. 160. [97] Id., No. 17. [98] Committee record, p. 14420 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 177 ". . . . I talked to the President over the telephone and I asked him whether he had received the paper which I had sent him over last night about the Japanese having started a new expedition from Shanghai down towards Indo-China. He fairly blew up-jumped up into the air, so to speak, and said he hadn't seen it and that that changed the whole situation because it was an evidence of bad faith on the part of the Japanese that while they were negotiating for an entire truce an entire withdrawal (from China) they should be sending this expedition down there to Indo-China. I told him that it was a fact that had come to me through G-2 and through the Navy Secret Service and I at once got another copy of the paper I had sent last night and sent it over to him by special messenger." It is to be noted that Mr. Stimson's diary for November 25, 1941, describes a meeting at the White House attended by the President; Secretaries Hull, Knox, and Stimson; General Marshall; and Admiral Stark. It states, in part: [99] "There the President, instead of bringing up the Victory Parade [100] brought up entirely the relations with the Japanese. He brought up the event that we were likely to be attacked (as soon as) next Monday without warning, and the question was what we should do. *The question was how we should maneuver them into the position of firing the first shot without allowing too much danger to ourselves. It was a difficult proposition*." [101] In referring to Mr. Stimson's comment concerning maneuvering the Japanese into the position of firing the first shot without too much danger to ourselves, [102] General Marshall testified: [103] "* * * they were trying to arrange a diplomatic procedure, rather than firing off a gun, that would not only protect our interests, by arranging matters so that the Japanese couldn't intrude any further in a dangerous way, but also anything they did do, they would be forced to take the offensive action, and what we were to do had to be prepared for the President by Mr. Hull. It was not a military order. It was not a military arrangement." The Chief of Staff stated that Secretary Stimson was referring to what the *diplomatic* procedure was to be; not the *military* procedure. [104] On November 28 Secretary Stimson called upon the President inasmuch as Military Intelligence had supplied him a summary of the information in regard to the movements of the Japanese in the Far East and "it amounted to such a statement of dangerous possibilities that I decided to take it to the President before he got up." Referring to his conversation with the President on this occasion, Mr. Stimson wrote in his diary: [105] "He (the President) branched into an analysis of the situation himself as he sat there on his bed, saying there were three alternatives and only three that he could see before us. I told him I could see two. His alternatives were first, [99] Id., at p. 14418. [100] This was an office nickname for the General Staff strategic plan of national action in case of war in Europe. [101] Mr. Stimson pointed out in this connection that our military and naval advisers had warned us that we could not safely allow the Japanese to move against British Malaysia or the Dutch East Indies without attempting to prevent it. Committee record, p. 14418. [102] In the course of committee examination, Admiral Stark was asked: "Now, I want to know why if you know, there was a distinction between the Atlantic and the Pacific about the firing of the first shot." He replied: "Germany had attacked and sunk one of our ships in June. She had attacked three destroyers in the Atlantic, sinking one of them I think it was in October or November, along in there, between September and October. And certainly the 1st of December she had attacked and wounded badly one tanker, the Salinas, I believe it was, which got back to the Canadian coast. The Congress of the United States had voted billions for material to go to Britain. We considered it our job to get that material through not simply to use this money for material and let it be sunk without taking any action on it. There were certain waters defined, and limits established, which, I believe, we called our waters. The President's speech shows it very plainly, in which he stated, if the Germans came within that area they would do so at their peril. They came in and attacked us. As a result, we got together what we called the hemispheric defense plans, which I have outlined previously and which provided for shooting at any German combatant ships which came within that area, and we did do it * * * I think that that situation is not comparable to what was going on in the Pacific, where the Japs had not attacked our ships, unless you go back to the Panay incident." Committee record, pp. 13981, 13982. [103] Committee record, p. 13801. [104] Id., at p. 13799. [105] Id., at p. 14423. 178 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK to do nothing; second, to make something in the nature of an ultimatum again, stating a point beyond which we would fight; third, to fight at once. I told him my only two were the last two, because I did not think anyone would do nothing in this situation, and he agreed with me. I said of the other two my choice was the latter one." Mr. Stimson set forth the following observations concerning the War Council meeting on November 28: [106] "It was the consensus that the present move (by the Japanese) that there was an Expeditionary Force on the sea of about 25,000 Japanese troops aimed for a landing some where completely changed the situation when we last discussed whether or not we could address an ultimatum to Japan about moving the troops which she already had on land in Indochina. It was now the opinion of every one that if this expedition was allowed to get around the southern point of Indochina and to go off and land in the Gulf of Siam, either at Bangkok or further west, it would be a terrific blow at all of the three Powers, Britain at Singapore the Netherlands, and ourselves in the Philippines. *It was the consensus of everybody that this must not be allowed*. Then we discussed how to prevent it. It was agreed that if the Japanese got into the Isthmus of Kra, the British would fight. It was also agreed that if the British fought, we would have to fight. And it now seems clear that if this expedition was allowed to round the southern point of Indochina, this whole chain of disastrous events would be set on foot of going. "It further became a consensus of views that rather than strike at the force as it went by without any warning on the one hand, which we didn't think we could do; or sitting still and allowing it to go on, on the other, which we didn't think we could that the only thing for us to do was to address it a warning that if it reached a certain place, or a certain line, or a certain point, we should have to fight. The President's mind evidently was running towards a special telegram from himself to the Emperor of Japan. This he had done with good results at the time of the Panay incident, but for many reasons this did not seem to me to be the right thing now and I pointed them out to the President. In the first place, a letter to the Emperor of Japan could not be couched in terms which contained an explicit warning. One does not warn an Emperor. In the second place it would not indicate to the people of the United States what the real nature of the danger was. Consequently I said there ought to be a message by the President to the people of the United States and I thought that the best form of a message would be an address to Congress reporting the danger, reporting what we would have to do if the danger happened. The President accepted this idea of a message but he first thought of incorporating in it the terms of his letter to the Emperor. But again I pointed out that he could not publicize a letter to an Emperor in such a way; that he had better send his letter to the Emperor separate as one thing and a secret thing, and then make his speech to the Congress as a separate and a more understandable thing to the people of the United States. This was the final decision at that time and the President asked Hull, and Knox and myself to try to draft such papers." Mr. Stimson's diary for December 2, 1941, contains the following comments concerning a meeting at the White House: [107] "The President went step by step over the situation and I think has made up his mind to go ahead. He has asked the Japanese through Sumner Welles what they intend by this new occupation of southern Indo-China just what they are going to do and has demanded a quick reply. The President is still deliberating the possibility of a message to the Emperor, although all the rest of us are rather against it, but in addition to that *he is quite settled, I think, that he will make a Message to the Congress and will perhaps back that up with a speech to the country. He said that he was going to take the matters right up when he left us*." On December 6 President Roosevelt dispatched his appeal to the Emperor; and, after the bombs had already fallen on Hawaii, our Ambassador in Tokyo was informed that it was desired the Japanese Memorandum of December 7, which was keyed for delivery to the United States coincident with the attack on Pearl Harbor, be regarded as the Emperor's reply to the President. [108] [106] Id., at pp. 14424, 14425. [107] Id., at p. 14427. [108] See Part I, supra, this report. PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 179 It is clear from the evidence that the feeling of the President and his advisers that the United States must fight if the British and Dutch ere attacked was predicated on the necessities of our own security and not occasioned by reason of any formal commitment or agreement requiring such action on the part of the United States. [109] That our Government was hoping to avoid war long after any real hope existed [110] made manifest by the fact that the President contemplated sending warning to Japan on "Tuesday afternoon or evening" (December 9) if no answer was received from the Emperor by Monday (December 8.) [111] In referring to the appeal to the Emperor, Mr. Hull said: [112] "The President was now making an additional last-minute appeal. He, of course knew that the huge Japanese armada had already left the jumping- off place in Indochina which from our viewpoint meant that the danger of attack could not have been more imminent. Nevertheless, *the President believed that he should not neglect even the slim chance that an additional last-minute appeal might save the situation. It also served to make clear to the American people and to the world our interest in maintaining peace up to the very last minute*." INTELLIGENCE AVAILABLE IN WASHINGTON THE "MAGIC" With the exercise of the greatest ingenuity and utmost resourcefulness, regarded by the committee as meriting the highest commendation, the War and Navy Departments collaborated in breaking the Japanese diplomatic codes. Through the exploitation of intercepted and decoded messages between Japan and her diplomatic establishments, the so-called Magic, a wealth of intelligence concerning the purposes of the Japanese was available in Washington. [113] Both the Army and Navy maintained several stations throughout the United States and in the Pacific for the purpose of intercepting Japanese radio communications. These stations operated under instructions mandating from Washington and forwarded the intercepted traffic to Washington without themselves endeavoring to decode or translate the material. The only exception to this procedure was in the case of the Corregidor station which had been provided with facilities for exploiting many of the Japanese diplomatic messages in view of its advantageous location from the standpoint of intercepting Tokyo traffic. [114] Insofar as the commanding officers in Hawaii were concerned they received none of the Magic save as it was supplied them by the War and Navy Departments in the original, paraphrased, or captioned form or, operationally, through instructions predicated on this source of intelligence. While the highest military officials in Washington did not know the precise nature of radio intelligence activities in Hawaii, it is clear that those charged with handling the Magic did not [109] See statement of Mr. Stimson, committee record, p. 14418. Also committee exhibits Nos. 16,17. [110] Admiral Stark was asked: "Was not that our intention (of doing anything possible to prevent war with the Japanese) right up to December 7, if it could be done without sacrificing American honor and principles?" He replied: "Yes, sir, and we had been working for months on that, and the record is complete in that regard." Committee record, p. 13915. [111] See committee record, pp. 13741, 13742. [112] See Secretary Hull's replies to committee interrogatories. Committee record, p. 14266. [113] See committee exhibits Nos. I and 2. For a discussion of Magic and its great significance to the prosecution of the war see letters dated September 25 and 27, 1944, from General Marshall to Governor Dewey. Committee record pp. 2979-2989. [114] For a discussion of the mechanics of the Magic see testimony of Admiral Noyes and Capts. L. F Safford and A. D. Kramer of the Navy, and Cols. Otis K. Sadtler and Rufus Bratton of the Army; before the committee.