PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 467 APPENDIX E THE "WINDS CODE" PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 468 APPENDIX E THE "WINDS CODE" Page Establishment and nature of the "Winds code" ...................... 469 Efforts to monitor ................................................ 471 Considerations bearing on the possibility of a message in execution of the "Winds code" having been received prior to December 7, 1941 ............................................... 471 Considerations militating against likelihood of "Winds code" execute message having been received prior to December 7, 1941 . 475 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 469 APPENDIX E THE "WINDS CODE" ESTABLISHMENT AND NATURE OF "WINDS CODE" The "Winds code" was established and confirmed by five communications, two of which were processed by the Navy; i. e., Circulars 2353 and 2354, as follows: [1] "From: Tokyo "To: Washington "19 November 1941 "Circular #2353 "Regarding the broadcast of a special message in an emergency. "In case of emergency (danger of cutting off our diplomatic relations), and the cutting off of international communications, the following warnings will be added in the middle of the daily Japanese-language short-wave news broadcast. "(1) In case of a Japan-U. S. relations in danger: HIGASHI NO KAZEAME.* "(2) Japan-U. S. S. R. relations: KITANOKAZE KUMORI.** "(3) Japan-British relations: NISHI NO KAZE HARE.*** "This signal will be given in the middle and at the end as a weather forecast and each sentence will be repeated twice. When this is heard please destroy all code papers, etc. This is as yet to be a completely secret arrangement. "Forward as urgent intelligence. "25432 "JD-1: 6875 (Y) Navy Trans. 11-28-41 (S-TT)" *East wind, rain **North wind, cloudy ***West wind, clear "From: Tokyo "To: Washington "19 November 1941 "Circular #2354 "When our diplomatic relations are becoming dangerous, we will add the following at the beginning and end of our general intelligence broadcasts: "(1) If it is Japan-U. S. Relations, "HIGASHI". "(2) Japan-Russia relations, "KITA". "(3) Japan-British relations (including Thai, Malaya, and N. E. I.); "NISHI". "The above will be repeated five times and included at beginning and end. "Relay to Rio de Janeiro, Buenos Aires, Mexico City, San Francisco. "25392 "JD-1: 6850 (Y) Navy Trans. 11-2641 (S)" By way of confirming the winds code and reflecting its nature the following dispatch, No. 281430, was received from the Commander in chief of the Asiatic Fleet: [2] [1] Committee exhibit No. 1, pp. 154, 155. [2] Id., No. 142 470 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK TOP SECRET 28 NOVEMBER 1941 FROM: CINCAF [3] ACTION: OPNAV 4 INFO: COMSIXTEEN CINCPAC COMFOURTEEN [5] 281430 FOLLOWING TOKYO TO NET INTERCEPT TRANSLATION RECEIVED FROM SINGAPORE X IF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS ARE ON VERGE OF BEING SEVERED FOLLOWING WORDS REPEATED FIVE TIMES AT BEGINNING AND END OF ORDINARY TOKYO NEWS BROADCASTS WILL HAVE SIGNIFICANCE AS FOLLOWS X HIGASHI HIGASHI JAPANESE AMERICAN X KITA KITA RUSSIA X NISHA NISHI ENGLAND INCLUDING OCCUPATION OF THAI OR INVASION OF MALAYA AND NEI XX ON JAPANESE LANGUAGE FOREIGN NEWS BROADCASTS THE FOLLOWING SENTENCES REPEATED TWICE IN THE MIDDLE AND TWICE AT THE END OF BROADCASTS WILL BE USED XX AMERICA HIGASHI NO KAZE KUMORI [6] XX ENGLAND X NISHI NO KAZE HARE X UNQUOTE X BRITISH AND COMSIXTEEN MONITORING ABOVE BROADCASTS Two further dispatches relate significantly to the winds code, the first from Consul General Foote, our senior diplomatic representative in the Netherlands East Indies, the second from Colonel Thorpe, our senior Army intelligence officer in Java. [7] "TELEGRAM RECEIVED "BF "This telegram must be Batavia "closely paraphrased be- Dated December 4, 1941 "fore being communicated FROM Rec'd. 9:19 a. M. "to anyone. (SC) "Secretary of State, " Washington. " 220, December 4, 10 a. m. "War Department at Bandoeng claims intercepted and decoded following "from Ministry Foreign Affairs Tokyo: " "When crisis leading to worst arises following will be broadcast at end weather reports; one east wind rain war with United States, two north wind cloudy war with Russia, three west wind clear war with Britain including attack on Thailand or Malaya and Dutch Indies. If spoken twice burn codes and secret papers." "Same re following Japanese Ambassador Bangkok to Consul General Batavia: " "When threat of crises exists following will be used five times in texts of general reports and radio broadcasts: one Higashi east America, two Kita north Russia, three Nishi west Britain with advance into Thailand and attack on Malaya and Dutch Indies." "Thorpe and Slawson cabled the above to War Department. I attach little or no importance to it and view it with some suspicion. Such have been common since 1936. "HSM FOOTE" [3] Commander in chief. Asiatic Fleet. [4] Office of Naval Operations. [5] Commandant Sixteenth Naval District; commander in chief, Pacific Fleet; commandant, Fourteenth Naval District. [6] It is to be noted that, apparently through inadvertence in transmitting the message, the code phrase referring to Russian has been improperly commingled with that referring to the United States. [7] See committee exhibit No. 142. PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 471 FROM ALUSNA BATAVIA OPNAV RRRRR DATE 5 DEC 1941 [8] DECODED BY KALAIDJIAN PARAPHRASED BY PURDY 031030 CR0222 FROM THORPE FOR MILES WAR DEPT. CODE INTERCEPT: JAPAN WILL NOTIFY HER CONSULS OF WAR DECISION IN HER FOREIGN BROADCASTS AS WEATHER REPORT AT END. EAST WIND RAIN XXXXXX UNITED STATES: NORTH WIND CLOUDY RUSSIA: WEST WIND CLEAR ENGLAND WITH ATTACK ON THAILAND MALAY AND DUTCH EAST INDIES. WILL BE REPEATED TWICE OR MAY USE COMPASS DIRECTIONS ONLY. IN THIS CASE WORDS WILL BE INTRODUCED FIVE TIMES IN GENERAL TEXT. (Signature illegible) DISTRIBUTION: WAR DEPT. ACTION FILES: CNO 20OP 20A RECORD COPY: 20C X SHOW OPDO TOP SECRET SECRET EFFORTS TO MONITOR The evidence is undisputed that both services extended themselves in an effort to intercept a message, in execution of the winds code, not only through their own monitoring stations but through facilities of the Federal Communications Commission as well. While only fragmentary evidence of a documentary nature is available to indicate the nature of instructions to monitor for an implementing or execute message, the Federal Communications Commission file is complete and, as indicated, there is no contention that every effort was not made to intercept an execute message. [9] CONSIDERATIONS BEARING ON THE POSSIBILITY OF A MESSAGE IN EXECUTION OF THE "WINDS CODE" HAVING BEEN RECEIVED PRIOR TO DECEMBER 7, 1941 1. Capt. L. F. Safford in a prepared statement (read before the joint committee) [10] has set forth a positive assertion that a winds execute message was received in the Navy Department *on the morning of December 4, 1941,* and has elaborated on the circumstances which serve, in his opinion, to indicate that a winds execute was dispatched and why such a message would have been dispatched from Tokyo. Safford asserted that when he first saw the message it had already been translated by Kramer; that Kramer had underscored all three "code phrases" on the original incoming teletype sheet; and that he had written in pencil or colored crayon the free translation: "War with England (including NEI, [11] etc.); war with the U. S.; peace with Russia." Safford has persistently testified that an authentic implementing message was received. [8] It is to be noted that this message bears the date December 5, 1941, whereas the "number group" is 031030, indicating December 3, 1941. From evidence available (see discussion, infra) it appears this message was dispatched from Batavia on December 3, 1941, but was not processed in the Navy Department until December 5, 1941, Inasmuch as the message was sent "deferred." [9] See committee record, pp. 9809, 9810. [10] Id., at pp. 9622-9654. [11] Netherlands East Indies. 472 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 2. Capt. A. D. Kramer testified before the committee that *on the morning of December 5* the GY Watch Officer, thought by him possibly to be Lieutenant Murray, came to the door of his office and showed him a message which he, Kramer, regarded as an implementation of the winds code; that he saw this message only briefly, relying on the evaluation of the GY watch officer as to the authenticity of the message; that he had no recollection of writing on the message but that had he written anything he positively would not have used the word "war"; that he proceeded to Captain Safford's office with the GY watch officer when the message was delivered to Safford; that he never saw the message again. [12] It should be noted that Kramer testified the message he saw was on a piece of teletype paper torn off from the machine and was not more than a line or two, possibly three lines; that in no case did the message contain some 200 words as alleged by Captain Safford in his statement. [13] Further, that the message he saw referred to only one country, which to the best of his belief was England. [14] This testimony must, of course, be considered along with Kramer's testimony before the Navy Court of Inquiry. When asked what Japanese language words were used in the execute message he saw, he replied: [15] "*Higashi No Kazeame*, I am quite certain. The literal meaning of *Higashi No Kazeame* is East Wind, Rain. That is plain Japanese language. The sense of that, however, meant strained relations or a break in relations, possibly even implying war with a nation to the eastward, the United States." 3. Admiral R. E. Ingersoll testified that during December of 1941 he was Assistant Chief of Naval Operations; that he saw "messages" which were supposed to implement the winds code, they being brought to his office; that he did not recall definitely whether he saw them prior to December 7 or thereafter; that an implementation of the code received prior to December 7, if genuine, would simply have confirmed what had already been dispatched to the Fleet regarding destruction of codes by the Japanese and would have required no action; that he thought the message he saw referred to all three countries; i. e. England, United States, and Russia. [16]" 4. Col. Otis K. Sadtler, in charge of the military branch of the Army Signal Corps in December of 1941, testified that about 9 a. m. or shortly thereafter on Friday, December 5, Admiral Noyes telephoned him to the effect that the "message was in" (referring to an implementing winds message); that Noyes told him "it was the word that implied a break in relations between Japan and Great Britain"; that he went to General Miles' office, informing Miles that the "word was in"; that Miles sent for Colonel Bratton and when Bratton came in, he, Sadtler, told Bratton word had been received from Admiral Noyes to the effect that diplomatic relations between Japan and Great Britain were in danger; that Bratton asked him to verify receipt of the message; that he called Admiral Noyes again, asking him to verify the "Japanese word" and Noyes replied that he did not know any Japanese but it was the one that "meant Japan and Great Britain"; that upon reporting this information to General Miles' [12] Committee record, pp. 10481 et seq. [13] Id., at p. 10491. [14] Id., at p. 10501. [15] Navy court of inquiry (top secret) record, p. 957. [16] Committee record, pp. 11278 et seq. PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 473 office he did not thereafter get in touch with Admiral Noyes concerning the message; that he never saw the message Noyes reported to him; and that insofar as he could ascertain it did "not come over", i. e. to his office or the Army. [17] 5. Col. Rufus S. Bratton, Chief of the Far Eastern Section of the Intelligence Branch of the Military Intelligence Division in December of 1941, testified that sometime around 9 or 10 a. m. on the morning of December 5 he was called to General Miles' office where Sadtler stated Noyes had just called to say "it is in" (the winds execute message); that Miles, at his suggestion, requested Sadtler to get from Noyes a copy either of the Japanese text or of the English translation so a determination could be made as to whether the message was a genuine execute or another false alarm; that he did not again see Sadtler concerning the matter; that he, Bratton, called up the Navy, talking to either Captain McCollum or Kramer to inquire if they had received a winds execute message and was advised that no such message had been received; that he contacted Army SIS [18] and was likewise advised that no execute had been received; that the Army continued to monitor for an implementing message up to and after the December 7 attack. [19] 6. Admiral Richmond K. Turner, Chief of War Plans in December of 1941, testified before the committee as follows: "On Friday afternoon, I think it was, of December 5, Admiral Noyes called on the telephone or the interphone, I do not know which, and said "The weather message", or words to this effect, "the first weather message has come in" and I said, "What did it say?" And he said, "North wind clear." And I said, "Well, there is something wrong about that," and he said, "I think so, too", and he hung up "I never saw a draft of that, I do not know from my own knowledge where he got it from. I assumed until recently that it it was an authentic message. From what I can determine since coming back here it was something entirely different, but it was never told to me. If it had come in and had been authentic I am certain that I would have received a copy of it." Turner testified that he did not see an implementation of the winds code applying to the United States. [20] 7. To complete the picture it would seem apropos to set forth the testimony of Rear Adm. Leigh Noyes at this point. Noyes, in December of 1941, Director of Naval Communications, testified before the committee that prior to December 7, 1941, no genuine winds execute message was brought to him of to his attention by anyone in the Navy Department; that prior to the Pearl Harbor attack there were several instances when messages were brought to him which were first thought to be winds execute messages but were determined not to be genuine; that the message described by Captain Safford in his statement, if received, would not have been regarded as an authentic execute message since (1) it is alleged to have been in Morse code and not by voice (2) no provision was made for a negative expression in the winds code (3) an execute would not have been [17] Id., at pp. 12357-12363. [18] Signal Intelligence Service. [19] Committee record. Pp. 12068-12077: Colonel Bratton testified: "I can state most positively that no execute of the winds codes was ever received by me prior to the attack on Pearl E[arbor. I find it hard to believe that any such execute message could get into the War Department without passing over my desk. "It is inconceivable to me. I might have missed it but I had some assistants who were on the watch for it, and there were some people in the Army SIS who were also on the watch for it. They couldn't all have missed it. It is simply inconceivable to me that such a message could have been in the War Department without some one of us knowing about it or seeing it." Committee record, p. 12089. [20] Committee record, p. 5214. 474 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK interpreted to mean war, and (4) Circular 2353 made no provision for N. E. I. as stated by Safford. With respect to Colonel Sadtler's testimony that Noyes called him saying "The message is in," or words to that effect, Noyes stated he had no present recollection of having made such a statement although he would not say it did not occur inasmuch as he talked with the chief signal officer a number of times each day. [21] Further, Noyes testified that he was directed to prepare a folder for the Roberts Commission but that it did not include a winds execute message and the folder in fact was supposed to contain no magic nor any reference to it; that the McCollum message, [22] to his knowledge, contained no reference to a winds execute message. [23] 8. The "Rochefort Message." On December 5, 1941, a dispatch signed "Miles" was sent by the War Department to the assistant chief of staff headquarters G-2, Hawaiian Department, as follows: [24] "Contact Commander Rochefort immediately thru Commandant Fourteen Naval District regarding broadcasts from Tokyo reference weather." At first blush, the foregoing dispatch would suggest, inferentially at least, the possibility of an execute message having been received. Colonel Bratton, upon whose recommendation the dispatch was sent, testified, however: [26] "I had a discussion with Commander McCollum, now Captain McCollum, as to the amount of knowledge that the Navy had in Hawaii. He assured me his man Rochefort there at that time knew practically everything that there was to be known about the U. S.-Japanese relations through one means or another. I knew that suitable warning messages had been sent out to Hawaii and elsewhere. I had not read the messages and did not know their exact contents. I wanted to make sure that our G-2 in Hawaii got in touch with the ONI man in Hawaii, to get from him all the intelligence that he had in his possession, and I knew that if they got together on the subject of this winds message I did not know, but I felt that they were going from there, and that there would be a complete exchange of intelligence and that the Army G-2 would then be in possession of just as much intelligence as Rochefort, the ONI man, had." Colonel Bratton's testimony is to the effect that the dispatch of the message to G-2 to contact Rochefort had nothing whatever to do with receipt of a message in execution of the winds code. In this regard Captain McCollum stated: [26] "I understood that G-2 was very anxious for their G-2 in Hawaii to have direct access with Commander Rochefort, who had the only agency capable of intercepting the winds message in Hawaii, sir. The Army, as I understand it, had no parallel set-up in Hawaii at that time." [21] In a statement submitted to the committee under date of February 25 1946, in amplification of his testimony Admiral Noyes said: "In reading over my testimony I noted that I failed to bring out the following point, which, however, is supported by my previous testimony and by documentary evidence. "In connection with the alleged telephone conversation with me on 5 December to which Colonel Sadtler testified and which I did not recall in that form: "On 5 December there was received from Colonel Thorpe in Batavia addressed to General Miles in the War Department. This message was transmitted by the Naval Attache to Nary Department for delivery to General Miles. As I have already testified the subject matter was under discussion between me and the War Department during that day. It is very probable that I would have called Colonel Sadtler and notified him of the fact that this message had been received and was being delivered to the War Department for General Miles on account of its importance. Since discussion took place between me and the War Department during that day on the subject matter of this message and the War Department recommended that we should make no change in our original translation of the set-up of the Winds Code (see previous testimony), it would appear that any possible authentic or false execute of the winds message would have also been discussed and settled during that day." Committee record pp. 14101, 14102. [22] See discussion, infra [23] Committee record, pp. 12605-12620. [24] Committee exhibit No. 32 p 20. [25] Committee record p. 12120, 12121. [26] Id., at pp. 9271, 9272. PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 475 CONSIDERATIONS MILITATING AGAINST LIKELIHOOD OF "WINDS CODE" EXECUTE MESSAGE HAVING BEEN RECEIVED PRIOR TO DECEMBER 7, 1941 1. Examination of Circular 2353 (to which Captain Safford admits the alleged winds execute was responsive) reflects that an execute warning would be added in the middle and at the end of the daily Japanese language short wave news broadcast "in case of emergency (danger of cutting off our diplomatic relations), and *the cutting off of international communications.*" When the execute was heard "all code papers, etc." Were to be destroyed. A reasonable construction of this circular would indicate that the winds code was an emergency arrangement designed to be employed in the event ordinary commercial means of international communications were no longer available to the Japanese Government. Contemplating that such commercial means conceivably might not be available to her, it would appear natural that Japan should devise a means such as the winds code to direct her diplomatic establishments to destroy their codes and secret papers. Manifestly and quite naturally the winds code should provide for destruction of all code papers inasmuch as the necessity for having any codes whatever of the type outstanding would be precluded by the cutting-off of international communications. Ordinary commercial means of communications were available to Japan up to the December 7 attack on Pearl Harbor and in fact committee exhibit 1 is replete with instructions to Japanese diplomatic establishments with respect to destruction of codes. [27] Accordingly, it can fairly be concluded that recourse to the emergency system provided by the winds code was not necessitated and in consequence was not resorted to prior to December 7 inasmuch as the contingency contemplating its use (cutting off of international communications) did not materialize prior to the Pearl Harbor attack. 2. It is admitted and of course definitely known that a winds execute message (*Nishi No Kaze Hare* west wind, clear) applying to England was transmitted from Tokyo stations JLG4 and JZJ between 0002 and 0035 GMT, December 8, 1941. [28] Such a message was of course reasonable inasmuch as Japan could very well contemplate that ordinary commercial means of communications would no longer be available after the Pearl Harbor attack. Inasmuch as a genuine winds execute message applying to England was transmitted after the Pearl Harbor attack, it would appear anomalous that such a message should also have been sent prior to December 7. [29] 3. The investigation conducted in Japan by headquarters of the supreme allied commander reflected that a signal implementing Circulars 2353 and 2354 was probably not transmitted prior to December 8, Tokyo time but was transmitted by radio voice broadcast at some hour after 0230, December 8, Tokyo time. [30] No evidence could be obtained that an implementing signal was transmitted by radio telegraph. Significantly, those who conducted the interrogation [27] See sections relating to destruction of codes pt. III and IV this report. [28] See committee exhibit No. 142. [29] Admiral Noyes suggested that Japan s sending an execute on December 7 was probably occasioned by reason of the fact that some Japanese diplomatic establishment had failed to respond to instructions to destroy their codes which had been dispatched through ordinary channels of communication. [30] December 7, Washington time. 476 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK in Japan had no knowledge prior to the interrogation that the United States had information that the winds code was used on December 8, Tokyo time. [31] Mr. Shinroku Tanomogi was head of the overseas department of the Japan Radio Broadcasting Corporation in December 1941, and as such was in charge of programs, including news programs, beamed to foreign countries. Upon interview he stated he had no recollection at all of any "east wind rain" report or any similar phrase being broadcast. Prior to December 8. [32] 4. Inquiry made through the State Department reflects that no winds execute message was intercepted prior to the Pearl Harbor attack by the British, Dutch, or Australians. [33] 5. In his statement submitted for the committee's consideration, Captain Safford definitely states that the alleged implementing winds message was part of a Japanese overseas "news" broadcast from station JAP (Tokyo) on 11980 kilcoycles beginning at 1330 Greenwich civil time on Thursday, December 4, 1941, this time corresponding to 10:30 p. m., Tokyo time, and 8:30 a. m., Washington time, December 4, 1941; that the winds message broadcast was forwarded by teletype from Cheltenham to the Navy Department shortly before 9 a. m. On December 4, 1941. Further, that when he first saw the message it had already been translated by Kramer; that Kramer had underscored all three "code phrases" on the original incoming teletype sheet; and that he had written in pencil or colored crayon the following free translations: "War with England (including NEI, etc.) "War with the U. S. "Peace with Russia." Kramer has testified that had he seen such a message, as alleged by Safford, he would in no case have interpreted a winds execute to mean war. [34] In this regard, the Thorpe and Foote messages, which interpreted the winds code as meaning war, were not available to the Navy Department until after the time Safford alleges the winds execute came in and was interpreted by Kramer to mean war. The Thorpe dispatch, while intended for General Miles of the War Department, was sent by Naval Communications and was received at the Navy Department at 1:21 a. m., December 4, l941. [35] It was not decoded until 1:45 a. m., December 5, 1941, the delay being occasioned by the fact that the dispatch was sent "deferred," the lowest priority in handling. [36] The Foote dispatch, it is to be noted, was not received in the State Department until 9:19 a. m., December 4. Consequently, as indicated, no information was available in the Navy Department on the morning of December 4 as alleged by Safford serving as basis for interpreting a winds execute message to mean war. Even conceding the availability of the Thorpe and Foote dispatches, it would scarcely appear likely that the Navy Department would disregard its own translation of the winds code and be guided solely by the dispatches from outside sources. [31] See committee exhibit No. 142 [32] Id., sec 4B. [33] Committee exhibit No. 142, secs. 4c, 4d, 4e. See also committee record, p. 11564. [34] See Navy Court of Inquiry (top secret) record, pp. 968, 969, 975, 987; committee record, 10492. [35] Committee record, p. 10135. [36] Id., at pp. 11255,11256.